Is evolvability evolvable? by Pigliucci, Massimo
The Modern Synthesis is the current 
paradigm in evolutionary biology1; it is 
an expansion of Darwin’s insights2 that all 
organisms share common descent and are 
adapted to the environment through natural 
selection. Several authors have called for 
and attempted to outline an extended 
evolutionary synthesis (EES)3–7, and most 
researchers who agree that such a synthesis 
is necessary regard evo–devo8–13 as provid-
ing the major impetus for it; after all, one 
of the elements that is missing from the 
original synthesis is an integrated account 
of development. In particular, the EES must 
explicitly account for the evolution of phe-
notypic novelties14–16 that are explained only 
in general terms by the Modern Synthesis. 
Although we know increasingly more about 
the molecular bases of such structures, we 
still do not have detailed scenarios about 
their evolutionary origin11, including both 
the specific developmental changes that are 
involved and the ecological conditions that 
favoured them.
Notwithstanding evidence from fields 
such as phenotypic plasticity, epigenetic 
inheritance and evo–devo, however, the EES 
is not yet around the corner. Nonetheless, 
it is instructive to ask what new elements 
a new synthesis might contain that are 
neither part of nor implied by the Modern 
Synthesis. Here I concentrate on one such 
element — evolvability. Alberch17 credited 
Dawkins18 with the first usage of the term, 
although the actual concept is much 
older. Since then, hundreds of papers have 
included the word evolvability (364, accord-
ing to a recent search on Web of Science), 
most of them conceptual or theoretical, 
but some based on empirical data. Given 
my contention that evolvability will be a 
cornerstone of the EES, it is appropriate to 
discuss how the idea of evolvability can be 
properly formulated, in what sense — if any 
— it differs from the concepts within the 
Modern Synthesis, such as heritability, and 
what exactly the EES can contribute to our 
understanding of evolution.
I begin with a discussion of the multiple 
meanings of evolvability that different 
authors have proposed. I then attempt  
to clear up some conceptual confusion and to 
show that, in fact, the term has been used  
to refer to different, if partly overlapping, 
phenomena. The middle portion of the 
paper will discuss the ‘building blocks’ of 
evolvability, such as robustness, modularity 
and the idea of a genotype phenotype 
(G P) mapping function. Finally, I discuss 
whether and under what conditions evolv-
ability itself might evolve, and what all of 
this means for the prospect of an EES.
The many meanings of evolvability
Although evolvability is a relative latecomer 
in the jargon of evolutionary biology, 
a remarkable number of people have 
attempted formal definitions of it19, generat-
ing some conceptual confusion, or at least 
pluralism, about what exactly it is. I will 
consciously refrain from providing my own 
definition because I am convinced that we 
are actually dealing with a family of related 
concepts that are well characterized by 
the available definitions. Therefore, I will 
instead examine the existing meanings  
to illuminate the theoretical work that 
biologists want evolvability to do and the 
sorts of empirical data that promote our 
understanding of evolvability.
At one end of the spectrum, evolv-
ability is either equated with or thought 
of as a refinement of the classic concept of 
heritability (TABLE 1). Fisher’s fundamental 
theorem of natural selection20 shows that the 
standing genetic variance in a population is 
a measure of the potential of that population 
to respond to natural selection. Accordingly, 
several authors explicitly treat heritability 
as a measure of evolvability: for example, 
Flatt21 defines evolvability as “the ability 
of a population to respond to selection,” 
whereas Griswold22 thinks in terms of the 
rate of evolution of a given character (which 
depends on its heritability, among other 
things). Houle23, however, has proposed that 
the genetic coefficient of variation, rather 
than heritability, is actually the appropriate 
quantification of evolvability (BOX 1).  
The genetic coefficient of variation allows  
the potential for evolution of different  
characters to be directly compared, regard-
less of type (for example, morphological 
characters or life history). Recently, this 
quantitative approach has been expanded 
into the multivariate concept of a genetic  
variance–covariance (G)-matrix24,25,  
despite standing criticisms of its useful-
ness26. Adopting a different angle, from 
computational science, Quayle and 
Bullock27 operationally measure evolvabil-
ity as the time that it takes for a population 
to hit a given phenotypic target (although 
this makes the simplifying assumption that 
the target itself doesn’t shift over time, as a 
result of environmental changes). However, 
all of these are restricted views of evolvabil-
ity that are certainly not what Dawkins and 
Alberch intended. Evolvability in the sense 
related to heritability, or the G-matrix, 
resides well within the Modern Synthesis 
and offers no particular excitement to  
theoretical biologists.
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Wagner and Altenberg28 moved sig-
nificantly from this ‘classical’ concept of 
evolvability with their groundbreaking 
articulation of the distinction between vari-
ation and variability as determining evolv-
ability. Variation is a measure of the realized 
differences within a population, whereas 
variability is the propensity of characters 
to vary (whether or not they actually do) 
and depends on the input of new genetic 
variation through mutation or recombina-
tion. Variation is measured by heritability 
and the G-matrix (or, better, by evolvability 
sensu Houle), whereas variability is an 
entirely new property that is not considered 
within the Modern Synthesis. Wagner and 
Altenberg argue that variability depends on 
the structure of the G P mapping func-
tion; that is, how the genetic architecture 
of an organism produces its phenotype 
through developmental interactions with 
the external environment4. Variability — a 
property of the so-called ‘M-matrix’ (analo-
gous to the G-matrix, but extending beyond 
standing variation to the variance that is 
induced by new mutations) — has been 
studied empirically, through mutagenesis 
experiments, mutation accumulation lines 
and artificial selection under laboratory 
conditions, to explore the phenotypes that 
are producible by genetic variants of  
reference genotypes29–30. One problem is 
that the M-matrix is a statistical summary 
of the variability-based relationships among 
traits, and therefore suffers from the same 
limitations as the G-matrix26. Moreover, it is 
not clear how one can go from the study of 
mostly deleterious mutations (which affect 
the M-matrix) to a theory of mutations  
that underlie phenotypic innovations.
Despite these caveats, the Wagner and 
Altenberg paper has unleashed a barrage 
of new definitions of evolvability, most of 
which turn out to be variations of Wagner 
and Altenberg’s own proposal. For example, 
West-Eberhard30 maintains that evolvability 
is “the ability of particular features of sys-
tems to facilitate change.” Dichtel-Danjoy 
and Felix31 say it is “the capacity to evolve 
at the phenotypic level, irrespective of the 
action of natural selection,” a point (that  
of the possibility of neutral evolution)  
that is agreed to by Schlichting and 
Murren19, for whom evolvability is “the  
tendency of a genotype or lineage to generate 
genetic variability and produce or maintain 
phenotypic variation over evolutionary time, 
enabling it to pursue diverse [not neces-
sarily adaptive] evolutionary trajectories.” 
Hansen32, however, although he adopts a 
definition similar to that of Schlichting and 
Murren, returns to Wagner and Altenberg’s 
contention that evolvability is interesting if it 
tells us about adaptation, as it represents “the 
ability of the genetic system to produce and 
maintain potentially adaptive genetic vari-
ants.” These definitions tend to be focused 
on phenotypes — a significant departure 
from the gene-centric view that is typical of 
the Modern Synthesis. The important point 
that distinguishes the Houle type from the 
Wagner and Altenberg type of evolvability 
is that the first depends on standing genetic 
variation whereas the second accounts for 
potential variation that is as yet unrealized  
in the population.
The last category of concepts includes the 
bold claim that evolvability is the propensity 
to evolve novel structures, as in Brookfield’s 
proposal33, “the proportion of radically differ-
ent designs created by mutation that are viable 
and fertile.” Of course, it is hard to get biolo-
gists to agree on what counts as a “radically 
different design,” but the idea actually arches 
back to Alberch’s17 contention that evolvabil-
ity is facilitated by major transitions in evolu-
tion34, such as the invention of multicellularity 
or the sequestration of the germ line.
This brief (and necessarily incomplete) 
survey demonstrates that biologists think 
of distinct, yet overlapping, concepts when 
they talk about evolvability, ranging from 
some variation of heritability to speculative 
claims about what made major evolutionary 
novelties possible, passing through an inter-
mediate type of evolvability (the most highly 
populated class of definitions and authors) 
that is conceptualized as whatever property 
of the genetic architecture and developmen-
tal system facilitates (adaptive) phenotypic 
evolution. Interestingly, the continuum of 
definitions (TABLE 1) moves across timescales, 
from consecutive generations (within 
populations to within species) to mid-range 
phylogenetic events (within species to within 
clades), to rare events that might actually 
occur only once in the history of life (clade-
level innovations, major transitions in evolu-
tion). This is not to imply that we are dealing 
with one conception of evolvability that 
can simply be scaled up (or down) at will. 
Rather, I see these concepts as a family of 
connected but partially distinct ideas under 
the general umbrella of evolvability.
Table 1 | The ‘conceptual spectrum’ of evolvability





Standing pool of genetic variation 
and covariation
Determines the response 
to natural selection within 
populations
Evolvability 




Includes variability (sensu Wagner 
& Altenberg), depends on genetic 
architecture and developmental 
constraints
Affects long-term adaptation, 
channels evolution along  
non-random trajectories,  







As for within species, but 
includes the capacity to 
overcome standing genetic 
and developmental constraints, 
opening new areas of phenotypic 
space for further evolution
Generates major phenotypic 
(morphological, behavioural or 
physiological) breakthroughs 
(novelties)
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The heritability end of the spectrum 
sits squarely within the Modern Synthesis. 
However, the end of the continuum that 
deals with major transitions is squarely in 
the territory that should be covered by the 
EES. This is not because the new ideas are 
incompatible with the Modern Synthesis 
(arguably, nothing in the EES is), but 
because they introduce new processes that 
enlarge the scope of the original synthesis 
and cannot reasonably be subsumed by 
it without resorting to anachronistic post 
facto reinterpretations of what that effort 
was historically about. The large middle 
ground of concepts (of the Wagner and 
Altenberg type) can be seen as a necessary 
building block of the EES. According to 
these definitions, evolvability is no longer 
seen as a matter of standing genetic variance 
but as a result of the propensity to vary that 
is afforded by the entire genetic architecture. 
This emphasizes the relevance of recent 
work on the properties of genetic networks 
(as opposed to individual genes or simple 
biochemical pathways)27,35–38. Moreover, the 
most sophisticated versions of evolvability 
invoke the ability of the developmental 
system to produce new adapted phenotypes, 
thereby pushing the frontier significantly 
beyond the genetic level and once again 
pointing to evo–devo as a key discipline  
for the EES.
Robustness, modularity and the G P map
The related concepts of robustness, modu-
larity, genetic architecture and the already 
mentioned G P map can be seen as build-
ing blocks that mechanistically underpin 
evolvability. Most of these terms are new 
and will probably constitute the vocabulary 
of the EES. However, they find their roots 
in one of the early challenges to the almost 
exclusive focus of the Modern Synthesis on 
natural selection: the idea that constraints 
have a significant role not only in limiting 
adaptation, but also in positively chan-
nelling and even facilitating the action of 
natural selection itself39–40.
A good example of this shift in focus  
from selective to non-selective features is  
A. Wagner’s discussion of robustness and 
‘neutral spaces’ in the G P map41. Neutral 
spaces are broad genotypic regions in which 
mutations do not change the phenotype 
or fitness. Neutral spaces mean that devel-
opmental systems are ‘robust’, and can 
accumulate genetic variants that might be 
non-neutral in a different environmental 
context, thereby augmenting evolvability. 
This concept offers a wholly different take on 
the old selectionist–neutralist controversy42.  
Empirical support comes from studies 
showing that transcription factors in bac-
teria evolve much faster than their target 
sequences35, an example of robustness-
induced flexibility of regulatory networks. 
Further evidence comes from viruses, which 
experience stronger selection for robustness 
when the likelihood of co-infection is low43, 
showing that robustness can be selected for. 
Also relevant is the finding that regulatory 
networks in yeast seem to evolve through 
neutral intermediates36, and that robust-
ness is one of three steady-state conditions 
uncovered by mathematical models of 
evolution in dynamic environments44.
Robustness41,45 has been studied using 
approaches varying from computer simula-
tions of digital organisms, to the artificial 
evolvability of protein functions, to under-
standing the properties of gene regulatory 
networks46. Adami, for example, concludes 
that there is a trade-off between robustness 
and the speed of replication in the evolution 
of digital organisms: at low mutation rates, 
faster–replicating organisms outcompete 
those characterized by robustness; however, 
above a certain mutational threshold, the 
situation reverses47. Moreover, mutational 
robustness itself in these systems can evolve, 
in accordance with ‘quasi-species’ theory, 
which was originally developed to explain 
evolution immediately after the origin of life 
in terms of the self-organizing properties of 
biological systems48. Another example is the 
experimental study of Bloom et al. on robust-
ness and its effects on the evolvability of 
proteins such as cytochrome P450 (REF. 49). 
An artificially produced thermostable 
version of P450 is more likely to evolve 
new or improved functionality because of 
an increased tolerance to new mutations 
(A. Wagner would call this an augmented 
neutral space).
The second keystone of evolvability is 
modularity22,50; that is, the degree to which 
groups of phenotypic characteristics are 
independent. For some authors, modular-
ity depends on the level and pattern of 
pleiotropy and epistasis51, although these 
two terms increasingly refer to a hetero-
geneous multitude of genomic phenomena. 
Moreover, too often the degree of modular-
ity is empirically measured simply by pheno-
typic or genetic correlations, which are not 
reliable inferential tools for depicting the 
underlying genetic architecture26.
The major point that authors do agree on 
is that there is some connection between the 
modularity of the genetic architecture and 
evolvability. But the agreement doesn’t go 
much further, partly — I suggest — because 
of the heterogeneity in the conception of 
evolvability itself. For example, Budd52 does 
not agree with Wagner and Altenberg’s 
‘classical’ view — that modularity facilitates 
evolvability because it uncouples groups 
of traits, thereby increasing the ability of 
some traits to evolve independently of other 
traits. Budd suggests instead that evolvability 
evolves because “it delivers the goods” 
— that is, it allows the evolution of whatever 
developmental system is suitable to a specific 
environment (and is, therefore, a direct 
target of natural selection), with modularity 
having a secondary role. Griswold22 endorses 
a conception of evolvability as being 
 Box 1 | Heritability versus evolvability (sensu Houle)
The standard measure of the potential of a natural (or artificial) population to evolve is the 
classic quantity of heritability, defined as:
h2 = R/S         (1)
where h2 is the heritability and R is the response of the population to a selective pressure S.
Heritability has been subject to much criticism because it is a local measure (it cannot be 
generalized beyond a specific trait, a given population and even a particular environment) and 
because its calculation is plagued by large confidence intervals that make the value of most 
applications dubious96. Houle also pointed out that heritability is not a good comparative 
measure for the propensity of various populations or traits to respond to selection, because of 
the high residual variance of many fitness-related traits, which tends to inflate the total 
phenotypic variance, artificially lowering estimates of h2 (REF. 23).
Instead, Houle proposed to use a measure of the broader property of evolvability, quantified as:
CVa = 100 (Va)/X          (2)
where CVa is the additive coefficient of genetic variation, Va is the additive genetic variance 
(that is, the portion of total variance that responds to selection), and X is the mean of the 
character in question in the given population.
Houle combed the literature for papers that allowed a comparison of heritability and 
evolvability, and found with some surprise that traits that are closely associated with fitness — 
which typically have low heritabilities — actually have relatively high evolvabilities, an 
observation that may require a reformulation of our understanding of the evolution of 
quantitative characters in natural populations.
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dependent on pleiotropy (and therefore 
modularity) but, as we have seen earlier, 
this derives from thinking of evolvability in 
terms of genetic (co)variances. Misevic et al. 
take a different approach in simulating the 
evolution of sexual and asexual organisms, 
and conclude that sex yields a more modular 
genetic architecture, which in turn increases 
evolvability53. This opens up the intriguing 
possibility that evolvability is a by-product 
of the evolution of sex. However, given how 
little we understand about the evolution of 
sex54, this is unlikely to be of huge comfort.
Inevitably, discussions of robustness and 
modularity come back to the G P map. 
The problem is that this concept has itself 
been elusive. Dichtel-Danjoy and Felix31 
frame the issue in terms of the accessibility 
of the ‘phenotypic neighbourhood’ from a 
given starting genotype: what phenotypes 
are or are not ‘accessible’ (via mutation or 
recombination)? They give the specific 
example of the evolution of nematode vulva 
development, but other instances of what 
they refer to as anisotropy of phenotypic 
space are represented by the evolution of 
RNA folding, and by the genetic code itself. 
These authors suggest that evolvability can 
be assessed by genetic screening of induced 
mutants, and some work in that direction 
has in fact already appeared29.
The G P map does implicitly invoke 
development (and associated phenomena, 
such as phenotypic plasticity) as the link 
between genotype and phenotype, and 
evo–devo research is called on to fill in 
the details of this black box. This article 
is not a review of evo–devo, but it is likely 
that it will be from the evo–devo research 
programme that such understanding will 
be forthcoming. Indeed, Hendrikse et al. 
suggest that what sets evo–devo apart from 
developmental biology on the one hand 
and evolutionary biology on the other is 
precisely the focus on which characteristics 
of the developmental system allow for an 
explanation of evolvability55.
Finally, evolvability can be linked to 
the G P map through the idea of adap-
tive landscapes. In this respect, one of the 
most lucid discussions is an early work 
by Conrad56. Conrad argues that evolv-
ability is made possible by what Gavrilets57 
more recently called “extra-dimensional 
bypasses,” connectors between phenotypes 
that appear as a by-product of the char-
acteristics of high-dimensional adaptive 
landscapes (BOX 2).
How does evolvability evolve?
Kirschner and Gerhart58 offered an early 
lucid discussion of the factors that might 
facilitate the evolution of evolvability, in 
particular the properties of regulatory 
processes that control development. It 
seems clear to me that evolvability — no 
matter how it is defined — does evolve. 
The evidence for this is beyond reasonable 
doubt. However, whether the evolution of 
evolvability is the result of natural selection 
or the by-product of other evolutionary 
mechanisms is very much up for discus-
sion, and has profound implications for our 
understanding of evolution in general.
Clear evidence of the evolution of evolv-
ability comes from the fact that both muta-
tion59 and recombination rates60 vary across 
species or clades and are influenced by the 
genetic makeup of an organism — they are 
not just passive results of external factors 
such as the level of background mutagenic 
radiation. It is also hard to deny that the 
makeup of the developmental system of a 
species — say, having an exoskeleton versus 
an endoskeleton — affects what sort of 
phenotypic space the descendants of that 
species can occupy. For example, there 
are strict limits to the evolution of body 
size in insects61 because of the allometric 
relationships that affect the shape of various 
organs, given the insect bauplan. The major 
transitions in evolution34 clearly affected 
the evolvability of all descendant clades; 
consider, for instance, the enormous new 
areas of phenotypic space that were opened 
up by the transition from unicellularity to 
multicellularity.
 Box 2 | Low- versus high-dimensional adaptive landscapes
Conrad’s56 discussion of extra-dimensional bypasses that connect peaks across an adaptive 
landscape, thereby augmenting the evolvability of populations, anticipated Gavrilets’57 work on 
the properties of high-dimensional landscapes by several years. To understand the significance 
of both Conrad’s and Gavrilets’ suggestions, we must realize that the so-called problem of ‘peak 
shift’ has been a major thorn for theoretical population biologists throughout most of the 
twentieth century, ever since Wright proposed the very idea of adaptive landscapes97.
Wright’s original 1932 paper aimed at presenting the mathematically complex idea of a 
relationship between fitness and the genetic architecture of an organism in a way that was 
digestible by most biologists, who were notoriously poorly versed in mathematics. Wright, 
following a suggestion by his mentor, presented his ideas graphically, as a diagram that related 
fitness to various dimensions of genetic differentiation, thereby producing a picture that 
resembled a rugged landscape. The metaphor was incredibly successful and was adopted by all 
the major architects of the Modern Synthesis, often with modifications and elaborations that 
had little direct connection with Wright’s ideas (for example, the palaeontologist George 
Gaylord Simpson talked of phenotypic, not genotypic, landscapes26, the two being related only 
through the anything but straightforward genotype phenotype (G P) map).
Indeed, one can argue that Wright’s metaphor was too successful, as researchers implicitly 
assumed that the properties of highly dimensional landscapes (which, obviously, cannot be 
represented in two-dimensional diagrams) are similar to those of the sort of bi- or three-
dimensional landscapes that Wright and others were drawing. This generated a large 
literature57 that attempted to solve the resulting peak shift problem: if a population climbs a 
particular adaptive peak (because of selection), how does it then move to another — perhaps 
higher — peak, when it cannot be selected to evolve through an intermediate phase of lower 
fitness? Eventually, it became clear that Wright’s own solution to the problem, his ‘shifting 
balance’ theory, would not work. Without entering into the details, shifting balance is a  
three-phase process that implies the action of both genetic drift and inter-population (that is, 
group) selection. Mathematical models as well as some experimental results have cast serious 
doubt on the likelihood of shifting balance occurring in natural populations98, except under 
special circumstances.
A breakthrough came with the work of Gavrilets57, who considered the possibility that high-
dimensional landscapes do, in fact, behave qualitatively differently from low-dimensional ones. 
Using percolation theory from physics as well as the new generation of fast computer 
processors, Gavrilets was able to show that reasonably high-dimensional landscapes (that is, 
those characterized by hundreds or thousands of genetic axes of variation) allow for large 
areas of quasi-neutral genotypic space in which populations can ‘slide’ (that is, evolve 
neutrally) with no appreciable change in their mean fitness. Moreover, Gavrilets made rigorous 
the concept of extra-dimensional bypasses in genotypic space, landscape features that  
make it possible for a population to do (in high-dimensional space) the equivalent of a (low-
dimensional) peak shift, without requiring the most controversial feature of the shifting 
balance mechanism — group selection.
We are only beginning to understand the properties of high-dimensional adaptive landscapes, 
but their logical connections to concepts such as robustness, modularity and G P mapping will 
also necessitate their role in our understanding of evolvability.
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Models of the evolution of evolvability 
are also clear in their verdict. Carter et al. 
showed that positive epistasis increases 
evolvability and negative epistasis leads to 
canalization51. Earl and Deem simulated the 
evolution of protein folding and concluded 
that randomly fluctuating environments 
lead to increased evolvability62, although 
this can be seen as a by-product of selection 
for increased recombination.
The arguments and evidence become 
more equivocal when one moves from 
evolvability as a by-product of selection  
to evolvability as the result. Alberch invoked 
higher-level selection for evolvability when 
he said that “there must have been selection 
among pattern generating systems favouring 
the ones that exhibit the adequate balance 
between stability and potentiality,”17 but 
of course it is not at all clear why selection 
“must” have facilitated evolvability.
Part of the problem is that such claims 
are vulnerable to Gould and Lewontin’s63,64 
critique of “adaptationism,” and for good 
reason. As Williams65 put it, “adaptation is 
a special and onerous concept that should 
be used only where it is really necessary.” 
The problem is the suggestion that natural 
selection could somehow favour properties 
that may prove useful to a given lineage in 
the future, but that have no present adaptive 
function. Philosophers of science66 as well 
as biologists67 have rightly cautioned against 
such a teleological fallacy.
There are some cases in which there is 
good evidence for a selective explanation for 
changes in evolvability. Several commenta-
tors68,69 agree, for instance, that bacterial 
mutator genes70 are perfectly good examples 
of systems in which the ability to evolve is 
selected because of its immediate beneficial 
consequences. In these systems, the muta-
tor allele is favoured because it is linked to 
whatever newly adaptive mutant alleles it 
generates. However, the same authors point 
out that such systems are unlikely to evolve 
in sexually reproducing organisms, because 
recombination rapidly breaks down the 
linkage between the mutator allele and its 
beneficial consequences. Note, however, 
that population genetics theory tells us that 
linkage disequilibrium is often maintained 
for long periods of time, depending on the 
specific genetic architecture that is under 
consideration (for example, when there is 
dominance), so different genotypes might 
have different immediate fitnesses and dis-
tinct levels of evolvability. Such a transient 
direct link between the two would allow 
natural selection for evolvability in sexual 
populations71.
Nonetheless, the conceptual terrain is 
treacherous (TABLE 2), as illustrated by the 
case of ‘evolution capacitors’. Intriguing 
experimental work with systems such as the 
ubiquitous Hsp90 heat-shock proteins72,73,  
a prion74 and even heritable epigenetic  
markers75 suggests that neutral genetic  
variation can accumulate in certain lineages, 
to be freed under stressful environmental 
conditions. This could accelerate the 
pace of adaptive evolution under the new 
conditions, and Hsp90-like systems would 
have acted as capacitors of phenotypic 
evolution. The authors of the original 
empirical papers72–74 have presented the idea 
of ‘capacitance’ in a way that more or less 
suggests that natural selection could favour 
capacitance itself.
There are several reasons for extreme 
caution about the link between evolvability 
and capacitance. Although Masel has 
produced a model that is analogous to a two-
locus system in population genetics showing 
that evolvability through capacitance can 
evolve by natural selection76, this again is 
true only in asexual populations. In sexual 
organisms, Bergman and Siegal show that 
functionally compromising most genes, 
not just heat-shock chaperones, can reveal 
previously hidden variation38. Although this 
might seem to make capacitance more  
Table 2 | Evolvability as a by-product or a result of natural selection?
Mechanism Class of phenomena Evolvability: target or by-product? 
Natural selection on linked effects ‘Mutator’ alleles in asexual systems Target, increases evolvability
Natural selection against signal degradation Change in mutation frequency (towards reduction) Target, but lowers evolvability
Natural selection against the breakage of 
adaptive gene complexes
Change in recombination frequency (usually 
suppression)
Target, but lowers evolvability
Natural selection on different genetic 
architectures (for example, dominance)
Slow decay in linkage disequilibrium Selection? Increases evolvability
Natural selection on adaptive novelties (for 
example, multicellularity)
Novelties that open up new areas of phenotypic 
space for future exploration
By-product, increases evolvability
Homeostatic buffering Hsp90-type capacitors By-product? Increases evolvability
Natural selection on other functions Prion-like capacitors By-product, increases evolvability
Clade selection Differential speciation or extinction Selection? Increases evolvability and innovation 
Glossary
Canalization
A concept first introduced by C.H. Waddington in the 
1940s to refer to the fact that development is often 
resistant to perturbation and seems to proceed along 
certain preferential directions (to be ‘canalized’  
along certain channels).
Epistasis 
A term that originated with quantitative genetic theory to 
describe a particular type of nonlinear statistical interaction 
of gene effects on quantitative traits. It is generally 
interpreted to be the population-level outcome of individual-
level mechanistic effects due to the biochemical interaction 
between gene products. However, there is actually  
no simple relationship between individual-level, mechanistic 
epistasis and population-level, statistical epistasis.
Negative epistasis
Gene–gene interactions that decrease a given phenotypic 
effect. This usage of the term epistasis refers directly  
to population-level, statistical effects.
Positive epistasis
Gene–gene interactions that enhance a given  
phenotypic effect. 
Quasi-species
A model for the evolution of replicating entities  
such as RNA and DNA, originally proposed by Eigen.  
The basic idea is that the early evolution of life was 
characterized by relatively high mutation rates, so  
that selection did not act on individual sequences  
but on clusters of closely related sequences,  
known as quasi-species.
Teleology
A philosophical approach, tracing back at least to 
Aristotle, that seeks explanations in terms of final  
causes. In evolutionary biology, teleology has often  
taken the form of some sort of vitalistic force that  
pushes evolution in a particular direction, for example, 
increased complexity.
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generally applicable, there is no need to 
invoke selection, as the finding is also 
compatible with the simpler hypothesis 
that these systems boost evolvability as a 
by-product of the way in which genetic 
networks and G P mapping in general are 
structured68,69,77. Indeed, both capacitance 
systems — Hsp90 and the [PSI+] prion-
determining region of yeast — have other 
functions in the cell: Hsp90 is a chaperone 
molecule that stabilizes other proteins in 
response to stress72, and there is indirect 
evidence that the prion-determining region 
of yeast is involved in other biological func-
tions related to growth rate in the event of 
some types of chemical toxicity74. At the 
moment, caution is appropriate unless one 
is willing to bite the larger bullet and invoke 
the possibility of clade-level selection78,79.
The debate on multiple levels of 
selection80–82 (BOX 3) certainly cannot be 
addressed within the scope of this Review. 
However, the increasing consensus is 
that multiple levels of selection are in fact 
demonstrable empirically83–85 whenever two 
levels conflict with each other, especially in 
the case of the individual versus the gene 
levels. It is certainly theoretically plausible 
to have selection at levels above the indi-
vidual86, and the issue is one of arguing for 
or against whether this actual happens in 
particular instances. This can be difficult, 
for the same reasons that species selec-
tion has always been controversial since 
Stanley87 proposed the concept as a corol-
lary to the theory of punctuated equilibria88. 
Ultimately, at least at the level of major 
transitions in evolution, we might simply 
have too few occurrences for a historically 
reliable analysis of causality and, for obvious 
reasons, it is not feasible to conduct experi-
ments at that level of complexity. However, 
we might still be able to test ideas about 
evolvability and natural selection at smaller 
scales, within large clades in which the phy-
logenetic comparative method can be used 
at its maximum strength.
Evolvability and the EES
Although evolvability represents one of 
the major conceptual novelties since the 
Modern Synthesis, there are two imminent 
problems facing the field, one theoretical 
and one empirical. The theoretical problem 
is to agree on a definition. I suggest that 
we should embrace the whole spectrum 
(TABLE 1), using the different overlapping 
concepts at different timescales and to 
address different questions. It follows 
that we should distinguish among three 
different meanings of the word, possibly 
actually using three distinct terms: concepts 
analogous to heritability (evolvability sensu 
Houle), phenomena such as capacitance 
and generative developmental constraints 
(evolvability sensu Wagner and Altenberg), 
and one that deals with the major  
evolutionary transitions (evolvability sensu 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary).
The empirical problem is to determine 
how evolvability itself can evolve, and 
whether natural selection is responsible89,90. 
One potentially promising approach here is 
the application of well developed comparative 
phylogenetic methods91 to studying evolv-
ability. These methods have been successfully 
applied to similar problems, such as the 
comparative study of so-called adaptive con-
straints92; that is, constraints on phenotypic 
evolution that result from the past action of 
natural selection. Indeed, adaptive constraints 
can be seen as a particular instance of  
lineage-specific evolution of evolvability.
 Box 3 | The ‘levels of selection’ debate
Classical Darwinian theory is framed by the implicit assumption that natural (including sexual) 
selection occurs at the level of individual organisms. As introductory texts in evolutionary 
biology often put it, selection acts on individuals, and as a result populations evolve.
This simple view has repeatedly been challenged on different grounds83,84,86,99. On the one 
hand, some biologists and philosophers have suggested that selection can occur above the 
level of the individual: group selection can take the form of the rather uncontroversial  
kin selection, inter-deme (that is, inter-population) selection, or even species- and clade-level 
selection. Although this possibility is now accepted in principle, it is still difficult to find clear 
empirical examples under natural conditions (but this in turn might be because few people 
have embarked on the delicate observations and manipulations that are necessary to do so).
From the opposite side of the debate, the claim has been made that the real targets of 
selection are genes, not organisms100, because genes are the long-term units of evolutionary 
change (they are the ones that are copied from one generation to the other, whereas 
organisms and their traits are ‘reconstructed’ through development, not inherited). Again, 
clear cases of gene-level selection have been convincingly demonstrated (for example, the 
non-Mendelian replication of transposons, repetitive DNA or genes that bias the meiotic 
process in their favour), but the broader idea that they are the ‘real’ target of selection can 
now be conclusively rejected99.
Part of the debate hinges on conceptual confusions. For example, to claim that genes are 
‘replicators’ (to use Dawkins’s terminology) and can therefore be used as units to track the 
evolutionary process is not at all the same as claiming that they are the targets of natural 
selection. It is easy enough to conceive of selection at the organismal level (say, to increase 
photosynthetic capacity), indirectly changing the frequencies of whichever genes are causally 
connected with the physiological process that is under selection (in this example, 
photosynthesis). Changes in genetic units can be used to track change over time in populations 
of plants, without denying that selection is really targeting a higher-level physiological process.
Whereas defenders of higher-than-individual levels of selection face the challenge of 
providing good empirical examples, advocates of gene-level-only selection are often forced to 
engage in intellectually unsatisfactory somersaults. For example, a classic objection to the 
primacy of individual genes is the very uncontroversial observation that genes never affect 
fitness by themselves but always do so in concert with other genes. Consider the simple case of 
heterozygosity101, whereby the net effect on fitness of allele A depends on what the other allele 
at the same locus happens to be (another A, or an alternative form, a). Because of this context-
dependency, how can one possibly argue that it is the gene (A or a) that is under selection, 
rather than the genotypic complex that characterizes a given organism? Champions of gene 
selectionism respond that, from the ‘point of view’ of the A allele, the second allele is ‘part of 
the environment’, but to treat the rest of the genome as an environmental factor seems to be a 
logically forced move to defend the a priori idea that selection acts only on genes.
An increasingly popular position among both philosophers and biologists83,99 is a pluralist 
one, which admits the theoretical possibility of multiple levels of selection but which treats 
every specific claim according to the empirical evidence that is available (or obtainable) to 
back it up. However, one important point that seems to have escaped most discussions on 
levels of selection is that there is no reason to ontologically favour the individual level (other 
than, historically, that was the level referred to by Darwin). Sceptics of group selection often 
claim that it should be considered only when individual-selection explanations are insufficient, 
essentially invoking Occam’s razor. But this is a misunderstanding of the principle of 
parsimony: although it is surely heuristically sound to avoid introducing explanatory principles 
that are clearly redundant, there is no known metaphysical reason why nature ought to 
function on the basis of the simplest possible set of causes. On the contrary, multiple causality 
is well known in both biology and everyday life, and individual-level selective explanations 
should not win by default just because they are the ones that we are most used to invoking.
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The broader context is that evolvability 
will constitute one of the foundational 
blocks for the much anticipated (or 
dreaded) EES in evolutionary biology93, 
together with other concepts that are new 
to — and yet build upon the achievements 
of — the Modern Synthesis. This expan-
sion will include the role of phenotypic 
and behavioural plasticity 4,7, a better 
understanding of the evolution of develop-
ment8–13, the role of epigenetic inheritance 
systems94, the idea of genetic accommoda-
tion7, the dynamics of evolution in highly 
dimensional adaptive landscapes57, and of 
course the wealth of information provided 
by the post-genomic era95. It is an exciting 
moment to be an evolutionary biologist.
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